Hajj Amin al-Husseini and the Roots of Antisemitism
Hajj Amin al-Husseini collaborated with Nazi Germany and spread antisemitic propaganda across the Arab world. Did his ideological legacy end in 1945? This report traces the historical evidence from wartime Berlin and the Muslim Brotherhood to Hamas and modern Gaza.
The history of antisemitism in the Middle East cannot be reduced to a single man, ideology, or historical moment. Anti-Jewish prejudice existed in different forms long before the twentieth century, just as European antisemitism had deep religious, racial, and political roots before Adolf Hitler came to power. Yet one figure occupies an unusually important position at the intersection of Palestinian nationalism, political Islam, and Nazi antisemitic propaganda: Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.
His importance is not simply that he met Hitler. Nor is it sufficient to describe him as a Palestinian nationalist who happened to seek German assistance against Britain and Zionism. The historical record shows something considerably more consequential. Al-Husseini actively collaborated with Nazi Germany, participated in antisemitic propaganda directed at Arab and Muslim audiences, helped mobilise Muslims on behalf of the Axis, and continued disseminating anti-Jewish propaganda after the Nazi regime had disappeared.
The harder question is what happened to those ideas afterward.
Did the ideological world that al-Husseini helped construct vanish with Nazi Germany in 1945? Or did elements of it survive, mutate and reappear in later Palestinian Islamist movements—including, eventually, Hamas in Gaza?
The evidence supports continuity, but not a simplistic straight line from Hitler to Hamas.
Before Hitler: Turning a Political Conflict Into a Sacred Struggle
Al-Husseini's political significance preceded his alliance with Nazi Germany.
Appointed Mufti of Jerusalem by British High Commissioner Herbert Samuel in 1921, he later became president of the Supreme Muslim Council. His political objectives included opposing Jewish immigration and Jewish national aspirations while increasing his own influence as an Arab and Muslim leader.
One of his most consequential political strategies was the religious framing of the conflict.
During the tensions surrounding the Western Wall in 1929, al-Husseini portrayed himself as a defender of Islamic holy sites against Jewish encroachment. According to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, he used the confrontation to generate broader Arab and Muslim interest in Palestine and strengthen his status as a religious leader. The resulting violence killed 133 Jews and 116 Arabs.
This distinction matters.
Opposition to Jewish immigration or Zionism could be expressed as nationalism, territorial competition or resistance to British policy. Al-Husseini increasingly placed those questions inside a religious framework in which the defence of Palestine—and particularly Jerusalem's Islamic holy places—became a matter affecting Muslims beyond Palestine.
That framework did not originate with Nazism. But it later provided fertile political terrain on which imported European antisemitic ideas could be combined with local religious and nationalist grievances.
Al-Husseini also established contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood well before the Second World War. The USHMM records that Brotherhood representatives travelled to Palestine in 1935, met al-Husseini and received his support and introductions.
That relationship is important because Hamas would later explicitly identify itself with the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.
It is not, however, proof that al-Husseini “created” Hamas. Nearly half a century separates the wartime Mufti from Hamas's establishment in 1987. Ideas, organisations and political circumstances changed dramatically in between. Historical influence must therefore be demonstrated rather than assumed.
Berlin: Al-Husseini Became a Nazi Collaborator
There is much less ambiguity about al-Husseini's activities during the Second World War.
After moving through Lebanon and Iraq, where he participated in the political environment surrounding the pro-Axis coup of 1941, al-Husseini eventually reached Europe. He met Adolf Hitler in Berlin on November 28, 1941.
The meeting is sometimes exaggerated in political debate. Al-Husseini did not persuade Hitler to invent the Holocaust, and serious Holocaust scholarship rejects claims assigning him responsibility for Hitler's decision to murder Europe's Jews. Hitler's antisemitism and the Nazi regime's movement toward mass extermination developed independently of the Mufti.
But correcting that exaggeration should not produce the opposite distortion.
Al-Husseini was not a passive visitor to Berlin.
USHMM documents show that he sought Axis support for Arab independence and the elimination of the proposed Jewish national home in Palestine. Hitler declined to provide the formal declaration al-Husseini wanted, but assured him that Germany's struggle would eventually extend to the destruction of Jews living in Arab territories under British protection.
Al-Husseini subsequently worked with the Nazi propaganda apparatus.
The Nazi regime financed and facilitated his Arabic-language broadcasts directed toward Muslims and Arabs. He broadcast anti-British and anti-Jewish messages, encouraged Muslim participation in Axis military formations and continued working with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy through the final years of the war. Germany provided him with substantial financial support and a residence and office in Berlin.
Historian Jeffrey Herf's research into Nazi Arabic-language propaganda adds an important dimension. German broadcasts adapted European Nazi conspiracy theories for Middle Eastern audiences, portraying Britain and the United States as instruments of Jewish power and presenting the war as a struggle against a common Jewish enemy. American monitoring records captured exceptionally violent broadcasts directed at the region. Al-Husseini and other Arab exiles helped the Germans make this propaganda more intelligible to Arab and Muslim audiences.
This represents more than a temporary alliance of convenience.
European conspiratorial antisemitism was being translated—literally and politically—into a Middle Eastern vocabulary.
The Most Important Date May Be 1945, Not 1941
If al-Husseini's importance ended with Germany's defeat, his relevance to contemporary antisemitism would be much easier to dismiss.
It did not.
After Nazi Germany collapsed, French authorities took him into custody. He escaped to Egypt in 1946. According to USHMM, he then continued producing and disseminating anti-Zionist, anti-Jewish and anti-Israel propaganda until later in his life. He died in Beirut in 1974.
This postwar period is critical.
Al-Husseini survived the destruction of the political system with which he had collaborated. Unlike senior Nazi officials prosecuted at Nuremberg, he returned to the Arab political world rather than disappearing into historical disgrace.
That does not mean postwar Palestinian nationalism was simply Nazism under another name. Such a claim would erase the enormous differences among Palestinian nationalists, Arab nationalists, communists, Islamists and other movements.
But it does mean that a prominent Arab leader who had openly collaborated with Nazi Germany was able to continue participating in the political and ideological struggle against Zionism after 1945.
The propaganda did not have to survive unchanged to survive at all.