Special Focus: Iran Doesn't Need a Face. Its Rivals Need a Reason

Iran’s leadership crisis reveals a regime built to survive without a visible figurehead, while the Saudi–Turkey–Pakistan defense pact exposes competing interests and emerging fractures across the Middle East.

Special Focus: Iran Doesn't Need a Face. Its Rivals Need a Reason

By Gershon Kogan, PhD — Orientalist, Journalist, Specialist in Iranian Studies

For most of the summer, the question inside Tehran's own system was not "will the war end" but "does the Supreme Leader still exist as a functioning actor." Mojtaba Khamenei had not appeared in public since taking the title in March. Two letters, a handful of decrees, and one undated video of him sitting in what was described as a religious studies class were the entire visual record of a man now formally responsible for a state at war. Iranian officials themselves gave conflicting signals: President Pezeshkian told state television in July that contact with the Leader was "increasing day by day," then weeks later called it "very difficult." The gap between those two sentences became, for a while, the most interesting fact about Iran.

Then, within the span of two days in mid-August, the gap closed — not with an appearance, but with a signature. Khamenei's office issued six decrees rebuilding the top of Iran's military establishment: a new chief of staff of the armed forces, a new IRGC commander, a new navy commander, a new head of the Basij. A day earlier, President Pezeshkian had installed Mohsen Rezaei, a 71-year-old veteran of the Iran-Iraq War and one of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' founding commanders, as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council — with Khamenei naming him his personal representative on the same body.

This was not the gesture of a man proving he was alive. It was something more revealing: proof that the question no longer mattered. Whether the hand behind those six decrees belonged to a fully capable Mojtaba Khamenei, a diminished one signing what was placed in front of him, or an IRGC leadership acting in his name and under his seal — the system produced the same output. Command chains were filled. A war continued to be run. The Islamic Republic has never been the kind of regime that lives or dies with one man's pulse, and August offered a quiet demonstration of exactly that: institutional continuity performing itself, indifferent to the question everyone outside Iran had spent months asking.

Nine hundred kilometers away, on the same week, a different kind of legitimacy was being tested — one built not on institutional depth but on a signature freshly dry.

Turkey's foreign minister Hakan Fidan, at a summit in El Alamein, called Egypt "one of the brotherly countries we consult with first on all issues" and floated a future in which the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement — the trilateral pact Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan had signed at Al-Safa Palace six days earlier — would not remain limited to three signatories. Egypt's foreign minister Badr Abdelatty answered with a sentence engineered to close a door without anyone hearing it close: the defense obligations, he said, would require in-depth study against Egypt's constitution and its existing legal commitments. He did not name the commitment. Every capital reading the statement understood which one he meant.

Two stories. One about a regime that stopped needing to prove a face was alive. One about an alliance that discovered, in its first week, exactly where it stops.

 

The Signal Inside the Signature

Read closely, the appointments carry a second layer of meaning that has nothing to do with continuity and everything to do with direction. Mohsen Rezaei did not simply replace Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. According to reporting from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, factions inside Tehran are reading the reshuffle as confirmation that the new Leader was never fully aligned with the course the Council had set on the so-called Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding — the framework reportedly shaping Iran's negotiating posture with Washington. Zolqadr had been appointed to the same post in late March, in the first days after Ali Khamenei's assassination, when the system's overriding priority was simply filling the vacuum. Five months later, the vacuum has been filled twice — and the second filling looks less like housekeeping and more like a correction.

The evidence is not a policy paper. It is a single sentence, deliberately opaque, and the fact that it required its own translator. Khamenei reportedly said he had, "in principle," disagreed with the direction the Council had taken on the memorandum — a phrase vague enough to mean almost nothing on its own. Rezaei supplied the gloss himself: when the Leader says he held a different view in principle, Rezaei explained, it means the path he had in mind was better than the one the Council actually followed. This is not analysis smuggled in from outside. It is the regime narrating its own internal disagreement, through an approved intermediary, in a sentence built to be quoted and requoted precisely because it says less than it appears to.

This is the register Iranian power has always preferred for its real arguments — not declared, but implied through the choice of who gets appointed, who gets reassigned to an advisory title, and who is deputized to explain what a cryptic phrase actually meant. Zolqadr's move to "political adviser to the Supreme Leader" is the regime's standard way of removing someone from operational power without admitting a demotion took place. Read together, the appointments say something more specific than "Khamenei is consolidating." They say: the Council's approach to negotiating with Washington did not survive the transition intact, and the men now running Iran's security architecture are the ones who thought the previous line was too soft.

None of this means Tehran has abandoned diplomacy for confrontation as a settled matter — Rezaei himself has spent the war projecting defiance publicly while the state continues, however unevenly, to engage on the Strait of Hormuz. What the appointments do establish is that the debate over how hard a line to take is not settled either, and that the newest Leader has just tipped his own government's internal balance toward the commanders who never fully accepted the memorandum's premises in the first place. A regime that does not depend on one man's pulse can still be moved, decisively, by which of its factions he chooses to promote.

 

A Door Reopened, and Closed Again

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement was six days old when it met its first real question, and the question was not military. It is worth being precise about what did and did not happen here about what did and did not happen here, because the temptation to read this as "Egypt snubbed the new Sunni NATO" flattens a more interesting fact. Egypt was never a late addition being courted from outside — it had been in the room from the beginning. Its foreign minister sat with his Pakistani, Saudi and Turkish counterparts at the sidelines of the March Riyadh summit, in talks that a Middle East Eye report described as Turkey's attempt to build a quadrilateral pact rather than a trilateral one. That earlier track went nowhere, and by the time the treaty was actually signed in Mecca in August, Egypt had dropped out of the frame entirely, without either side ever explaining why in public. The August invitation, then, was not Ankara reaching toward a new partner. It was Ankara reopening a door it had already tried, and failed, to keep open the first time.

The refusal exposes not weakness in the pact but a genuine divergence in what each of its three members is actually building. Pakistan's defense minister has spoken of a broader Islamic collective-security system in terms that were explicitly framed against Israel — a framing Islamabad can afford because it has no peace treaty with Jerusalem to protect and everything to gain from being treated, for the first time, as central to Middle Eastern security architecture rather than peripheral to it. Turkey wants regional leadership and has said openly it does not intend to stop at three members. Saudi Arabia's calculus is the most consequential and the least explicit of the three: analysts at the Belfer Center have read the pact as confirmation that Riyadh has, at least for now, stepped back from the possibility of joining the Abraham Accords — trading a still-hypothetical normalization with Israel for a concrete defense guarantee that includes a nuclear-armed partner. Three different countries, three different reasons to sign the same document, and Cairo's polite refusal is simply the moment those different reasons became visible to everyone watching.

This structural difference matters more than the treaty's language about an attack on one being treated as an attack on all. Iran's regional network, whatever else can be said about it, was built on a genuinely shared framework — Khomeinist doctrine, the mostaz'afin-mostakbarin vocabulary Ali Shariati grafted onto Shia political thought, decades of financing and training that produced actors who, however instrumentally, spoke a common ideological language. What is forming around Iran now is not that. It is a coalition of states with overlapping fears and non-overlapping interests, discovering in real time which of their members can afford to be named as anti-Israel and which cannot. Iran built a network. Its competitors are only beginning to build an architecture — and architecture built on divergent blueprints tends to reveal its stress points early, not late.

 

What Actually Changed

Put the two stories next to each other and a shape appears that neither headline captured on its own. Iran spent the summer proving, almost accidentally, that its stability was never where outside observers had been looking for it. Not in one man's health, not in his public appearances, not even in certainty about whose hand actually signed six decrees in a single week. The system absorbed the death of one Supreme Leader, months of uncertainty about the next one, and an internal argument sharp enough to require its own translator — and it kept filling command chains, kept running a war, kept producing outputs indistinguishable from a healthy institution doing ordinary business. That is not evidence that the Islamic Republic is strong in the way its defenders claim. It is evidence that it was never built the way its critics assumed.

The coalition forming around Iran is discovering the opposite problem in real time. It is not short on capability — Saudi money, Turkish military-industrial reach, and a Pakistani nuclear guarantee is as serious a combination as the region has assembled in decades. What it is short on is the thing Iran's network never lacked even at its weakest: a shared reason to exist. Riyadh is buying insurance against a war it did not choose. Ankara is buying regional leadership. Islamabad is buying relevance. Each of those is a rational transaction. None of them is an ideology, and Cairo's quiet refusal in El Alamein was the first moment the difference became visible to anyone outside the four foreign ministries involved.

Neither side of this comparison should comfort anyone hoping for a stable outcome. A regime with no personalist center of gravity is much harder to defeat by decapitation — the last serious attempt at exactly that produced Mohsen Rezaei and six hardline generals, not a vacuum. And a coalition built on divergent interests rather than shared conviction is not necessarily fragile; NATO itself spent seventy years proving that overlapping fear can outlast the absence of shared belief, provided the fear stays overlapping. The open question is whether Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani fear of the same things will hold together as well as Iranian institutions have held together without a functioning face at the top.

What is disappearing, either way, is the framework most Western commentary has been using to read this war — one where regime survival depends on a leader's pulse, and where new alliances are read primarily through who they are directed against. Tehran has just demonstrated that the first premise was always weaker than it looked. Mecca has just demonstrated that the second one requires everyone at the table to actually agree on what they are afraid of, and not every capital in the region is afraid of the same thing.


Gershon Kogan holds a PhD in Persian philology and writes on Iranian politics, culture, and the language of war. He publishes with the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) and contributes regularly to Israeli Russian-language media.

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