Why Japan Needs an Anti-Espionage Law — And a Counterintelligence Strategy to Match
Does Japan need an anti-espionage law? How counterintelligence can protect Japanese technology, national security and democratic institutions.
Japan has spent decades protecting its territory.
It must now take equal measures to protect its information.
Advanced manufacturing technologies, semiconductor expertise, artificial intelligence, quantum research, defense-related knowledge, critical infrastructure data and scientific discoveries are not simply commercial assets. In an era in which economic security and national security increasingly overlap, they form part of a country's strategic wealth.
And Japan possesses much of that wealth.
That makes the country valuable not only to its allies and economic partners, but also to foreign intelligence services.
Recent cases involving suspected Russian intelligence activity have again exposed an uncomfortable question for Tokyo:
Can Japan adequately identify, disrupt and punish espionage conducted on behalf of a foreign power?
The question matters far beyond Russia.
Japan lives beside Russia, China and North Korea while simultaneously serving as one of the United States' most important allies in the Indo-Pacific.
Japan's information security is therefore no longer merely a domestic law-enforcement issue.
It is a matter of national resilience.
And that is why Japan's debate over an anti-espionage law deserves to be taken seriously.
Espionage in Japan Is Not a Theoretical Threat
Espionage is sometimes imagined as something that happens elsewhere.
That assumption is dangerous.
Japan's own National Police Agency has documented cases involving suspected foreign intelligence activity and attempts to obtain sensitive technological information.
One particularly revealing case involved a former employee of a major Japanese telecommunications company who was arrested after obtaining trade secrets concerning wireless base-station technology.
According to Japanese authorities, the information was connected to a Russian believed to be an intelligence officer attached to Russia's Trade Representation in Japan.
The significance of such cases extends far beyond the information that was allegedly obtained.
They demonstrate how modern espionage works.
A foreign intelligence service does not necessarily need to penetrate the Ministry of Defense or steal classified documents from a government building.
It can target the private sector.
It can target engineers.
It can target researchers.
It can cultivate relationships with people who already possess legitimate access to valuable information.
The battlefield of modern intelligence collection therefore extends far beyond Kasumigaseki.
It reaches Japanese companies, universities, laboratories and research institutions.
The Person Carrying the Secret May Be Japanese
This point deserves particular attention.
When the public hears the word spy, it is easy to imagine a foreign national secretly operating inside Japan.
Reality can be considerably more complicated.
The person who copies a document, photographs a prototype, downloads technical data or explains sensitive technology may be a Japanese citizen with perfectly legitimate access to the information.
That is precisely why counterintelligence cannot be based on ethnicity or nationality.
A Russian passport does not make someone a spy.
Neither does Chinese nationality, Korean ancestry, or contact with a foreign embassy.
What matters is conduct.
The relevant question is whether an individual is knowingly acting at the direction of, on behalf of, or for the benefit of a foreign state or intelligence service in order to obtain information Japan has a legitimate security interest in protecting.
That distinction is essential.
Japan needs stronger counterintelligence.
But it must be counterintelligence compatible with a democratic, law-governed state.
Why Wasn't the Spy Simply Arrested?
This is where the Japanese debate becomes difficult.
When suspected foreign intelligence operations become public, an understandable reaction is:
Why wasn't the spy arrested?
The answer is more complicated than it appears.
Police cannot arrest someone simply because authorities believe that person is an intelligence officer.
Japan is a constitutional democracy. An arrest must be connected to an offense defined by law and supported by the evidence required under Japanese criminal procedure.
Japan already possesses mechanisms for protecting sensitive information.
The Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets protects particularly sensitive national-security information.
Japan has also expanded its economic-security framework and introduced systems for handling important economic-security information.
The Unfair Competition Prevention Act provides legal tools against the theft and unlawful disclosure of corporate trade secrets.
These protections matter.
The question, however, is whether they are sufficient for the strategic environment Japan now faces.
Because there is an important conceptual difference between prosecuting someone because a particular file qualifies as a protected trade secret and prosecuting conduct because it constitutes espionage undertaken on behalf of a foreign power.
That distinction leads to the question Japan must now confront:
Does Japanese law adequately address espionage as espionage?
The Problem Begins Before the Arrest
There is an even deeper problem.
Suppose Japan creates a stronger anti-espionage law tomorrow.
Suppose prosecutors are given clearer legal tools to pursue individuals who knowingly obtain protected information on behalf of foreign intelligence services.
That would matter.
But it would not solve the entire problem.
Because by the time a spy is arrested, the intelligence operation may already have succeeded.
The document may already have been photographed.
The technical specifications may already have been copied.
The research may already have been transmitted.
The relationship between a foreign intelligence officer and a Japanese source may already have existed for years.
And unlike a stolen physical object, stolen knowledge cannot simply be recovered.
Once information has crossed the border, Japan cannot make the recipient forget it.
The real question, therefore, is not merely whether Japan can punish espionage after the damage has occurred.
It is whether Japan can recognise, monitor and disrupt a hostile intelligence operation before strategically valuable information is lost.
That requires something larger than criminal law.
It requires a serious national counterintelligence strategy.